Another classical and related distinction pertains to the divisibility of sovereignty. The issue whether sovereignty can be divided is as controversial as that of whether it can be limited. In fact, both issues are very closely connected and often conflated. Older and recent literature refer to absolute sovereignty to mean unlimited sovereignty as much as undivided sovereignty. For the sake of clarity, I will refer to absolute sovereignty by contrast to limited sovereignty only, although divided sovereignty can obviously no longer be deemed absolute either. The original theoretical model of State sovereignty is often attributed to Jean Bodin and his Six Livres de la République published in 1576. This book provides the first coherent theory of State sovereignty, although it is only towards the end of the 17 th century that it was recognized as such in practice. In a period of intense religious conflicts, Bodin describes an authority capable of putting an end to the war: the Republic. The contradictions multiply. Tombs is deeply committed to the two central and intertwined propositions that have propelled Britain towards its deeply uncertain fate as a semi-detached adjunct to that continent. The first is that sovereignty is an absolute concept; it “can be given up, but not shared”. The second is that “there was only one meaningful Brexit, which was to leave the Single Market, the Customs Union and the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice”. Next, Ryan is a successful financial advisor. Once again, I respect most people that are financial advisors. They’re usually highly intelligent, have incredible intuition, and are very sensible. Stephen Bronner has been an important critical voice on the American political scene for the past few decades. Here, in his book The Sovereign, Bronner provides an original and provocative set of views on this urgent topic—especially topical owing to its clear focus on such pressing issues as immigration, refugees, populism, transnational power, and the fate of democracy not only in the United States but around the world. As usual, Bronner presents his work in a style accessible to both an academic and general readership. The book is highly recommended for anyone interested in the special challenges facing contemporary American politics." — Carl Boggs, Professor of Social Sciences, National University, author of Fascism Old and New and Origins of the Warfare State

Sovereignty and Policy - 1st Edition - Maggie Indigenous Data Sovereignty and Policy - 1st Edition - Maggie

It means we have right to this land. It is our land. We never ceded the right to the land, the sea and the air. We have never given that right away. We never told white people in any way that we had given them this country. There are no contracts of any sort, no treaties. It is still our land. In the first instance, Tombs is too true to his profession to peddle the Brexiter myth that continued membership of the EU was incompatible with the historic identity of “our island nation”. He knows that other European countries have “histories of struggles for independence and democracy at least as proud as our own, but which so far they find compatible – if with some strain – with European integration”. Following the analogy between States and individuals entering private contracts discussed before, sovereign States are generally held as being able to bind themselves as free rational agents. For a long time, this was actually the only way in which the legitimate authority of international law over sovereign States could be justified. The paradox or dilemma of sovereignty implies indeed that States must be capable of binding themselves if international law is to exist, and also incapable of binding themselves through international law if they are to be absolutely independent. Among the different ways out of the paradox, self-limitation was deemed the least unobjectionable. This is explained by reference to the idea of normative immediacy, famously captured by the ICJ in the Wimbledon case (at 25), according to which those States that are immediately bound by law and vice-versa are sovereign and legal persons (see also Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations [Advisory Opinion]).In sum, State sovereignty is not necessarily compatible with the authority of international law. It is only the case when the latter has legitimate authority, ie furthers State autonomy and the reasons that underlie State autonomy. Those can be understood by reference to the values that make a good State or more generally a good political entity such as self-determination, democracy, and human rights, but also the values that make a good international community of equal sovereign entities. Of course, this should not be taken to mean that State sovereignty is only incompatible with international law’s authority when it is illegitimate. There may be cases where autonomy requires legitimate authority, but others where self-direction is valuable despite the prima facie justification of international law’s authority. Too much international regulation would empty sovereign autonomy from its purpose. The question of the degree of power and amount of competence necessary for an entity to become or remain sovereign has given rise to a long controversy in the history of the concept. In international law, internal sovereignty is used to mean the supreme authority within a territory or the ultimate power within that territory ( Customs Regime between Germany and Austria [Advisory Opinion] [Individual Opinion of Judge Anzilotti] 57). These two definitions refer to very different facets of sovereignty which correspond to its normative and empirical dimensions. Both have been present at different times in the evolution of the concept of internal sovereignty and their tension underlies most of the concept’s history. A third additional conception of sovereignty is absolute independence or freedom and it captures what is at stake in external sovereignty (arbitrator Max Huber in the Palmas Island Arbitration). Secondly, however, with respect to further international human rights, States may not commit to more than their constituency could and what that right to have rights or self-government authorizes. When the international legal norms at stake pertain to the basic rules of political legitimacy at the domestic level and to the details of human rights protection, both international sovereignty and international human rights law have met their intrinsic limitations. Deciding on what makes us members of a political community and how to protect our equal rights as such is likely to be the last issue to leave the scope of collective self-government and hence of sovereignty. Hence, for instance, the application of principles such as the State margin of appreciation or proportionality in international human rights adjudication. Lauren Benton, A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400-1900 (Cambridge: CUP, 2009)

Sovereignty by Ryan Michler: A Review — DEDICATED TO DISCIPLINE Sovereignty by Ryan Michler: A Review — DEDICATED TO DISCIPLINE

In the digital age, governments are increasingly dependent on data and data analytics to inform their policies and decision-making. However, Indigenous Peoples have often been the unwilling targets of policy interventions and have had little say over the collection, use and application of data about them, their lands and cultures. At the heart of Indigenous Peoples’ demands for change are the enduring aspirationsof self-determination over their institutions, resources, knowledge and information systems. In response to this difficulty, some authors have suggested the idea of limited sovereignty. The problem then is to know when sovereignty is so limited or fragmented that there can no longer be any talk of sovereignty. The concept of sovereignty implies a certain amount of intensity or of competence over a certain range of matters. As presented before, legal sovereignty is a general competence, ie a competence to determine one’s particular competence; as such, it requires a minimal level of control over those competences. In other words, is there a threshold below which sovereignty is emptied of any content and if so, where does that threshold lie? It is important to emphasize, however, that the notion of external sovereignty was not entirely absent from classical authors’ considerations. The emergence of modern sovereignty went hand in hand with claims to external independence and this concern may be retrieved, for instance, in Machiavelli, Bodin, or Hobbes’ writings. Mary Dewhurst Lewis, Divided Rule: Sovereignty and Empire in French Tunisia, 1881-1938 (California: University of California Press, 2013) In case of violation of the minimal right to have rights and of minimal sovereignty duties as a result, ordinary mechanisms of international dispute settlement can be triggered, ranging from political recommendations to full adverse judgments depending on the sources of the rights violated and the mechanisms available. Those mechanisms imply some kind of international institutional framework through which other States but mostly individuals can initiate claims against a sovereign State.Sovereignty is recognised reciprocally, meaning that sovereign entities (usually nations) recognise each other’s sovereignty. Sovereignty vs self-determination He had another statement that said the following: “Will you choose to be free to do what you feel like doing at risk of the bondage that comes in the end? Or do you want to subject yourself to the discipline required now to achieve ultimate and lasting freedom?” There is another more promising way to justify the authority of international law on sovereign States, but also on their populations and on IOs that is in line with the modern account of sovereign autonomy proposed so far. D. Philpott, Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001) There is, moreover, an underlying tension in the idea of “the people” in an explicitly multinational state like the UK. Tombs gets over it (as he gets over other problems for the idea of exclusive sovereignty, like the climate crisis) by refusing to recognise it. Even his most basic term of reference is evasive. His title speaks of an “isle”, singular. In the text, this slips awkwardly into “our islands”. But by “our”, he really means England’s: all his key points of reference are English.

Aboriginal sovereignty in Australia - Creative Spirits Aboriginal sovereignty in Australia - Creative Spirits

Chapter 3: The Intersection of Indigenous Data Sovereignty and Closing the Gap policy in Australia, Raymond Lovett, Roxanne Jones and Bobby Maher Equally, Tombs, like all Brexiters, expresses his contempt for the second referendum on the Lisbon treaty held in Ireland in 2009 after the first one was defeated. He claims that the first vote was “overruled”. It wasn’t. A democratically elected Irish government negotiated changes and a free electorate endorsed the treaty by a two-to-one majority. In doing so, Tombs claimed, the Irish had “given up their sovereignty”. Apparently, a referendum is a sovereign act only when the result is one of which Tombs approves.By contrast, numerous variations of the principle and so-called ‘correlated’ principles of sovereignty, as opposed to the principle of sovereignty itself, can be found in conventional international law. This is the case in particular of Art. 2 (1) UN Charter for the principle of sovereign equality, but also in the Friendly Relations Declaration (1970) for the detailed rights that follow from that principle of sovereign equality. The UN Charter also protects sovereign States’ domaine réservé and prohibits other States’ intervention on sovereign States’ territory (Arts 2 (4) and (7) UN Charter). Further correlated principles to the principle of sovereign equality may be found in general principles of international law and customary international law, and have been progressively recognized in international adjudication. While Austin and command theorists give priority to political sovereignty over legal sovereignty, Hart and later positivists have criticized that approach and give priority to legal sovereignty over political sovereignty. Other authors like Kelsen argue, on the contrary, that political and legal sovereignty are identical because the law subsumes the political and cannot therefore be put in any relationship of priority. More recently, some authors have tried to dissociate legal and political sovereignty and re-associate legal to institutional sovereignty.